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The primary purpose of this study was to examine the demographic characteristics of Boards of Directors
in the hospitality industry, and how those characteristics can impact a firm's performance during a major
crisis. More specifically, using the upper echelons perspective, this study examined the impact of finance-
oriented directors, and directors who were outsiders, on a company's stock price during the great
recession. Results using companies from the hospitality industry indicate that companies that had the
highest percentage of finance-orientated directors tended to fall further and recover less quickly. Yet, in
the aftermath of the crisis, companies that performed worse during the crisis tended to increase the
percentage of finance-oriented directors. The authors of the study assert that extending the application
of the blissful ignorance effect is a logical explanation for the behavior found in the results.
© 2017 The Authors.1. Introduction
How an organization performs during changes in its external
environment can be critical to its success (Cho & Hambrick, 2006;
Hambrick, 2007; Ocasio, 1997). This can be particularly true when
companies experience a crisis (Goldberg & Petasnick, 2010). In the
hospitality sector, for example, potential crises include: outbreaks
of food-borne illnesses, rodent infestations, equipment break-
downs and supply disruptions. Perhaps most calamitous is when
whole industries, or whole economies, are hit with a wide-spread
crisis, such as a natural disaster or an economic collapse, that is
defined as a high-impact event that threatens the organization's
viability and is characterized by ambiguity of cause and effect
(Brandstrum, Bynander, & Hart, 2004; Pearson & Clair, 1998).
Though wide-spread crises occur somewhat infrequently, they do
present opportunities to examine how differing organizations
perform while facing a similar scenario. As such, research on these
larger events could shed light on howorganizations perform during
more local disasters.
Inspired by a framework for crisis management by Smits and
Ezzat (2003), which was itself influenced by the upper echelonsinto).perspective (Hambrick&Mason, 1984), the primary purpose of this
paper was to examine the impact of finance-oriented directors on a
company's ability to successfully manage a major crisis. Post hoc
tests were then used to explore any significant changes in the
percentage of finance-oriented individuals on the BODs during a
major crisis. Finally, the author(s) of this study assert that the
combination of the results from the primary, and ad hoc analysis,
are best explained by extending the managerial application of the
concept called “blissful ignorance”.2. Literature and hypotheses
In 2003, Stanley Smits and Niveen Ezzat presented a framework
for crisis management that argues that firm performance during a
crisis event is the responsibility of organizational leadership; that a
firm's response to amajor change in their environment is shaped by
the ability of organizational leadership to adequately process in-
formation in a timely manner (Ocasio, 1997; Smits & Ezzat, 2003).
And while many actors within an organization may play a role in
environmental scanning, much of the data gathering and inter-
pretive work is assumed to be done by the organization's leader-
ship (Cho & Hambrick, 2006). In turn, the ability of an
organization's leadership to effectively and efficiently respond to
information is dependent, at least in part, by the characteristics of
that teamdthe upper echelon perspective (Hambrick & Mason,
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Significant evidence exists to support purported links between
the demographic characteristics of the organization's leadership
and organizational actions (Hambrick, 2007; Nielsen, 2010a;
Adams et al., 2015). For example, studies have found significant
relationships between the demographic makeup of an organiza-
tion's leadership and a company's proclivity to discuss entrepre-
neurial issues (Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010), its inclination
to internationalize (Rivas, 2012; Hsu, Chen, & Cheng, 2013), and
their bent to focus on innovation (Talkea, Salomob, & Rost, 2010).
Further studies have successfully linked demographic characteris-
tics to a firm's voluntary financial disclosure choices (Bamber, Jiang,
& Wang, 2010), the comprehensiveness of a firm's strategic
decision-making process (Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989) and the
makeup of an organization's strategy (e.g., Geletkanycz &
Hambrick, 1997; Alexiev, Jansen, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2010).
However, as for a direct link between the demographic char-
acteristics of a firm's leadership and firm performance, there is
mostly conflicting evidence (Nielsen, 2010b; Adams et al., 2015). As
such, there remains a need for further tests of the link between
demographic characteristics and firm performance.
Since the publication of the seminal paper on the Upper Echelon
perspective (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) the demographic charac-
teristic that appears to have garnered the most attention is di-
versity, this includes several reviews, at least onemeta-analysis and
numerous papers (Adams et al., 2015; Homberg & Hong, 2013;
Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013; Nielsen, 2010a; Talkea et al., 2010).
Emulating the general links between leadership characteristics and
firm performance, there is a lack of consensus among studies that
have examined the specific link between leadership diversity and
firm performance.
On one hand greater diversity should make it more likely that
leadership will become aware of new stimuli and to include it in
relevant discussions, thus leading to better performance (Hambrick
& Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). And results of one recent study,
Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2015) showed that greater age diversity can
lead to more effective visions and strategies, which in turn leads to
a greater adoption of more effective corporate governance codes. In
another study, Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco (2016) found that
gender diversity directly leads to higher firm performance.
On the other hand, greater leadership diversity could increase
social friction and discourage social integration, which could
negatively impact the efficiency of the decision-making process,
leading to larger hits on the bottom line (Adams et al., 2015;
Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2015; Li, 2013; Smith et al., 1994). In sum,
past tests on the relationship between diversity and firm perfor-
mance have found negative effects (Murray, 1989), no effects
(Homberg&Hong, 2013; Michel&Hambrick, 1992; Nielsen, 2010a)
and positive effects (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990) Therefore,
further studies are needed to establish which of the three scenarios
is most valid.
Given the lack of concrete guidance from either the theoretical
or the empirical realm, the author(s) of this study crafted a set of
hypotheses using the assumption that there is a positive relation-
ship between leadership diversity and firm performance during a
crisis event. Support for such a perspective can be found in a paper
from Talkea et al. (2010) and others, who convincingly argued that
demographics characteristics of the Board of Directors, specifically
diversity, can among other things, enhance firm performance by
facilitating innovation, which in turn, generates new ideas that
could help companies weather a widespread economic crisis
(Chavan, 2005; Smart& Vertinsky, 1984; Zack, 1999). Therefore, the
author(s) of this study argues that TMT diversity can have a strong
positive impact on choices made, which in term leads to better firm
performance.This leads to two sets of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a. During a major economic crisis, firms having a
higher percentage of outsiders on the BODs will fall less than firms
having a lower percentage of outsiders on the BODs.
Hypothesis 1b. During a major economic crisis, firms having a
lower percentage of individuals with a finance orientation on the
BODs will fall less than firms having a higher percentage of in-
dividuals with a finance orientation.
Hypothesis 2a. During a major economic crisis, firms having a
higher percentage of outsiders on the BODs will have a better re-
covery than firms having a lower percentage of outsiders on the
BODs.
Hypothesis 2b. During a major economic crisis, firms having a
lower percentage of individuals with a finance orientation on the
BODs will have a better recovery than firms having a higher per-
centage of individuals with a finance orientation.3. Method
3.1. Sample
The author(s) identified 81 hospitality companies listed on
either the NYSE or the NASDAQ exchange. The author(s) of this
study elected to use the hospitality industry because unlike in-
dustries such as manufacturing, the hospitality industry is crisis
prone and vulnerable to numerous external pressures (Ritchie,
2004).
3.2. Data sources
All primary and post hoc data was gathered through the use of
DEF 14As and 10Ks using the Edgar company filings website of the
SEC; and Yahoo Finance.
3.3. Timeframe
This study explored the link between BOD diversity and firm
performance during the Great Recession. The U.S. National Bureau
of Economic Research declared that the ‘Great Recession’ started on
December of 2007 and ended on June, 2009. Therefore, this study
used December 1, 2007 as the starting point for this study and June
30, 2009 as the end point of this study.
3.4. Dependent variables
Given the relative paucity of empirical investigations on the
determinants of firm performance during a crisis, widely accepted
constructs for measuring performance during a major crisis do not
exist. However, the work done by Smits and Ezzat (2003) suggests
that the extent of a firm's fall and the extent of a company's re-
covery could be two reasonable metrics.
To determine the extent of a firm’s fall and the extent of a
company’s recovery, the author(s) first utilized Yahoo Finance’s
Interactive Stock Chart to tract the Dow Jones Index fromDecember
1, 2007 to June 30, 2009. During the 18 months of the Great
Recession, the Dow Jones composite hit its nadir on March, 9th of
2009. Not surprisingly, the movements of the individual stocks
used in this study have similar V configurations, with 80% of the
individual stocks used in this study hitting their nadir 30 days
within the ninth of March of 2009.
Therefore, the author(s) used the stock price on the day each
company hit its nadir to calculate both the extent of a company’s
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author(s) calculated the extent of a firm’s fall by subtracting the
stock price at that company’s nadir by the stock price on December
1, 2007 (the start the Great Recession), and dividing that by the
stock price on December 1, 2007, to get the percentage change as
the measure of the extent of a stock’s fall. Similarly, the author(s)
calculated the extent of a firm’s recovery by subtracting the stock
price on June 30, 2009 (the end the Great Recession) by the stock
price of the company’s nadir and dividing that by the stock price on
the company’s nadir to get the percentage change as themeasure of
the extent of a stock’s recovery.
It was the author(s) judgement that changes in individual stock
prices were an appropriate measure of organizational performance
during a crisis. First, stock prices possess attributes such as objec-
tivity and understandability, which are required of acceptable
performance measures (Merchant & Bruns, 1986). Further, in a
study of 241 firms, Lehn andMakhija (1996) found that stock prices
were highly correlated with economic value added (EVA) and
market value added (MVA), arguing that stock prices are effective
and relevant metrics.
Using stock prices, as opposed to accounting figures, would also
allow analysis with dependent variables that were more readily
aligned with the timing of the crisis event. In addition, since the
economic crisis in question was reflected by a severe drop in stock
prices, using company stock prices as dependent variables seemed
a logical fit. Finally, by using individual stock prices as the depen-
dent variable, this study assumed it would be capturing the re-
actions of individual market participants based on their
perceptions of how well individual companies are performing
during a crisis. In essence, market participants will be looking for
any signs that specific companies are effectively and efficiently
responding to the current situation (Pandelica & Pandelica, 2009,
pp. 311e324).
This assumption seems reasonable given work on signal theory
(Spence, 1973) which other streams of research have co-opted
(Karasek & Bryant, 2012). For example, Marcus and Goodman
(1991) found that signals can serve the interest of shareholders
during a crisis and one recent study examining the New York Stock
Exchange found that market participants re-adjusted their pre-
crisis expectations of returns to companies that had received
higher corporate social responsibility ratings (Becchettie, Ceniccola,
& Ciciretti, 2010, pp. 1e42). And in a related study, Higgins and
Gulati (2005) discovered that attributes of organization's leader-
ship can impact investors' decisions. Therefore, it seems reasonable
to conclude that market reactions are important, if for no other
reasons to attract resources; which could be particularly vital
during a crisis.
3.5. Independent variables
In prior tests of the diversity performance link researchers have
used a variety of measures, such as age, tenure, gender, race and
education (Adams et al., 2015; Nielsen, 2010a). However, logic and
precedent (Brochet&Welch, 2011) lead the author(s) to employ the
two measures that seem most appropriate for predicting perfor-
mance differences during a major economic crisis: the percentage
of outside directors, and the percentage of finance-oriented in-
dividuals on the BODs.
3.5.1. Percentage of outsiders on the BOD
This variable was derived by dividing the number of the out-
siders on the BOD by the BOD size (the number of board members).
The author(s) selected to use Board of Directors (BODs), rather than
Top Management Teams (TMTs), because at least one prior study
noted that when all other variables were equal, diversity in theBODs made a significant impact on firm performance, while the
diversity in the TMTs did not make any difference to firm perfor-
mance (Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009).
3.5.2. Percentage of individuals with a finance orientation
This variable was calculated by dividing the number of in-
dividuals with a finance orientation on the BOD by the BOD size.
Our definition of “finance-oriented individuals” is anyone on the
BODs who were describe in their biography (in the DEF 10-A) as
having significant experience as a Treasurer, Chief Financial Officer,
Controller, or a partner of a finance company ORwhowere describe
in the DEF 10-A as having an “expertise in finance”. This follows a
similar method used by Brochet and Welch (2011).
3.6. Control variables
Organizational performance is often constrained by a variety of
factors, such organizational age, size and past performance
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Therefore, four control variables were
included in the model: company age (years since founding); com-
pany size (total sales prior to each time period in question); BOD
Size (determined by the total number of members on the BOD) and
past performance. For the analysis of the extent of the fall, the
percentage change in stock prices during the 18-month period
prior to the start of the Great Recessionwas used as themeasure for
past performance. It seemed logical to calculate past performance
as a 18 month period given that the Great Recession lasted 18
months. As for equations testing the extent of recovery, the au-




Table 2 provides the relationships among the dependent, inde-
pendent and control variables. Correlation analysis reveals a sig-
nificant negative relationship between the percentage of finance-
oriented individuals on the BODs and the extent of a stock's fall,
suggesting that firms having a lower percentage of finance-
oriented board members will fall less during a major economic
crisis, which would support hypothesis 1b. Unfortunately, there
were no other significant relationships that support or refute any of
the other hypotheses. However, the author(s) did find significant
relationships between three of the four control variables (company
age, company size, and BOD size). While these relationships were
not predicted, the results are not unexpected. Finally, there is a
significant negative relationship between the extent of a company's
fall and the extent of a company's recovery, whichmay suggest that
companies that fell the most had the better recoveries.
In further tests of the hypotheses, the author(s) utilizedmultiple
regression analysis. Column I of Table 3 indicates that after con-
trolling for firm age, firm size, BOD size and past performance, two
independent variables have significant coefficients. First, there is a
positive relationship between the percentage of outsiders and the
extent of a stock's fall. In other words, during a major crisis, firms
with larger percentages of outsiders fell less than firms with
smaller percentage of outsiders. This result supports hypothesis 1a.
Second, the percentage of finance-oriented individuals on the
BOD is significantly and negatively associated with the extent of a
stock's fall, meaning that the stock prices of firms with a higher
percentage of finance-oriented individuals on the BODs fell further
during an economic crisis than companies with a lower percentage.
This finding supports hypothesis 1b.
Looking at column II in Table 3, there seems to be a relatively
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Company Age 2 96 36.48 21.862
Company Size 8 34,290 2068 4709
BOD Size 4 15 8.31 2.08
BOD % Outsiders 0.44 1 0.75 0.11
BOD % Finance 0 0.86 0.36 0.2137
Past Performance 5.85 0.9 0.09 0.83
Extent of Fall 0.98 0.23 0.65 0.22
Extent of recovery 0.01 3.37 1.04 0.76
N ¼ 81.
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oriented individuals on the BOD and the extent of a stock's recov-
ery, which supports hypothesis 2b, which stated that during a crisis,
firms having a higher percentage of individuals with a finance
orientation on the BOD will recover more poorly than firms having
lower percentage of individuals with a finance orientation. Finally,
there is a very significant negative relationship between the extent
of the fall of a company's stock price and the extent of the recovery
of a company's stock price.
4.2. Post hoc results
Given the relatively strong findings that a greater percentage of
finance-oriented individuals on the BOD seems to lead to weaker
stock performance during a time of a crisis, the author(s) decided to
explore whether there were any changes in the percentage of in-
dividuals with a finance orientation on BODs after the crisis had
abated.1 Looking back to Table 1, the average percentage of in-
dividuals with a finance orientation on BODs in 2008was 36%. After
collecting post hoc data from the same sources used to collect the
primary data, the authors discovered that the average percentage of
individuals with a finance orientation on the BODs five years later
was 44% (a t-test found the differencewas significant at the p < 0.01
level). The outcome suggests that although higher percentages of
finance oriented individuals on the BODs seem to have a detri-
mental impact on company's stock performance, these same
companies decided to increase the percentage of finance-oriented
directors on their BODs in the aftermath of the crisis.
Further analysis (Table 4) presents the results of a multiple
regression using change in the percent of the individuals with a
finance orientation on BODs as the dependent variable. There are
two significant relationships. First, there is a strong negative rela-
tionship between the percentage of finance-oriented individuals on
the BODs in 2008 and the percentage change in the percentage of
finance-oriented individuals on the BODs. In other words, com-
panies with BODs that had the fewest percentage of individuals
with a finance orientation on the BOD in 2008, added the greatest
percentage of finance-oriented directors five years later. In addi-
tion, there is a relatively strong and negative relationship between
the percentage change in the BOD size and the percentage change
in the percentage of finance oriented individuals on the BODs.
Translation: among hospitality companies, as BOD size decreased,
the percentage change in the percentage of finance oriented in-
dividuals on the BODs increased, which means that companies
reduced the percentage of non-finance oriented individuals rather
than the percentage of finance-oriented individuals.
5. Discussion
5.1. Primary discussion
A review of prior literature led to two sets of hypotheses linking
diversity in the BODs (the percentage of outsiders and the per-
centage of individuals with a finance orientation) and firm per-
formance (the extent of the fall of a company's stock price and the
extent of the recovery of a company's stock price) during a major
economic crisis.
The two most significant findings are: the strong negative
relationship between the percentage of individuals with a finance
orientation and the extent of the fall of a firm's stock price, and the
strong negative relationship between the percentage of individuals1 Similar Post Hoc tests were performed using the percentage of outsiders. No
significant results were found.with a finance orientation and the extent of a the recovery of a
firm's stock price, which support hypotheses 1B and 2B respec-
tively. These results are similar to the work by Minton et al. (2011)
who found that during the great recession, financial expertise
among independent directors of financial institutions were nega-
tively associated to changes in both Tobin's Q and cumulative stock
returns. And in a more general sense, this study supports other
recent studies that found significant direct relationships between
the demographic characteristics of organizational leadership and
firm performance (Colbert, Barrick, & Bradley, 2014; Eesley, Hsu, &
Roberts, 2014; Huang, 2013; Post & Byron, 2015; Terjesen et al.,
2016), thus further solidifying one of the main tenets of the
upper-echelons perspective, that demographic characteristics of
organizational leadership can accurately predict firm performance
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). At the same time,
these outcomes provide credibility to Smits and Ezzat's (2003)
framework for crisis management, which argues that firm perfor-
mance during a crisis is at least partially determined by the de-
mographic characteristics of a company's organizational
leadership.
Although this study revealed a strong connection between the
percentage of finance-oriented individuals on the BODs and firm
performance during a major crisis, the findings do not completely
explain the whole story. As such, it is worthwhile to consider
possible behavioral attributes that might better explain the results.
For instance, literature exists that argues that individuals with a
finance orientation, such as CFOs, tend to be more conservative
than other members of an organization's leadership, especially in
such decisions as: investment policies, financing policies, budget-
ing and internal control (Goodman, O'Brien,& Segal, 2000; Chava&
Purnanandam, 2010; Lawson & Omer, 2012). Another line of liter-
ature suggests, and evidence supports, that companies should be
aggressive during a crisis in order to increase firm performance
(Chavan, 2005; Smart& Vertinsky,1984; Zack,1999). Therefore, in a
crisis, if any of the company's stakeholders presented a plan that
included actions that were ‘appropriate’, but financially aggressive,
they would probably face stiff resistance, if not upright rejection,
from the more conservative finance-oriented directors.5.2. Post hoc discussion e blissful ignorance
The primary results supported the hypotheses that a greater
percentage of finance-oriented individuals on the BODs are asso-
ciated with inferior performance during a time of a major crisis as
measured by a company's stock price. Post hoc tests on the struc-
ture of the BODs five years after the crisis found a significant in-
crease in the percentage of finance-oriented individuals on the
BODs, most likely by either shrinking the board via jettison in-
dividuals who did not have a finance orientation, or by increasing
the number of finance-oriented individuals on the board. But no
matter how the companies increased the percentage of finance-
Table 3
Performance: Multiple regression analysis with Extent of Fall and Extent of Re-
covery as dependent variables.
Extent of Fall I Extent of Recovery II
Age of Company 0.070 (0.559) 0.019 (0.852)
Size of Company 0.003 (0.983) 0.021 (0.845)
Past Performance 0.139 (0.198) 0.632*** (0.000)
BOD Size 0.139 (0.261) 0.085 (0.424)
BOD % Outsiders 0.233* (034) 0.083 (393)
BOD % Finance 0.266** (0.018) 0.227** (0.025)
Constant 0.1.039 0.227
R square 0.172 0.375
F-value 2.562** 7.414***
N ¼ 81.
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
Table 4
Multiple regression analysis with changes in the percentage of individuals with a
finance-orientation on the BOD as the dependent variable.
Age of Company 0.000 (0.997)
% Change BOD Size 0.220* (0.033)
Extent of Fall 0.106 (0.412)
Extent of Recovery 0.130 (0.293)





Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
Table 2
Correlations among all variables.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Company Age 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.16 0.08
2. Company Size 0.41*** 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.10
3. BOD Size 0.08 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.17
4. BOD % Outsider 0.12 0.03 0.19 0.06
5. BOD % Finance 0.01 0.28** 0.03
6. Past Performance 0.13 0.10
7. Extent of Fall 0.57***
8. Extent of Recovery
N ¼ 81 for all relationships.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
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would increase the percentage of finance-oriented individuals on
the BODs when such actions could be detrimental to their firm's
performance.
One plausible explanation, originating from the field of con-
sumer behavior studies, is the Blissful Ignorance Effect. This
research suggests that when people know less about something, it
is easier for them to create their own thoughts about a decision–
which leads to greater satisfactiondand that once people become
committed to something they want to be happy about their deci-
sion (Schiffman Leon, 1988, p. 95; Solomon, 2011, p. 318). The
blissful ignorance effect has been used to explain the one-way flow
of information between physicians and patients (Lupton,
Donaldson, & Lloyd, 1991), the feedback on students' perfor-
mance (Bandiera, Larcinese, & Rasul, 2015), the rationale of some
supreme court decisions (Dery & Hernandez, 2007), and the blan-
ket statements made about sportswomen in the 19th century
(Guttman, 1991).
However, in the management sciences, the majority of de-
scriptions of ignorance simply refer to settings where there is a
scarcity of knowledge (Aven & Steen, 2010). Congleton (2005)argues that individuals and groups (including organizational lead-
ership by assumption) may embrace policies that are less effectual
at advancing their objectives–that organizational decision-makers
realize that unknown parameters exist but they purposely (and
blissfully) decide not to investigate anything about the issue in
questioned (Congleton, 2005). In other words, ‘blissful ignorance’
within business settings is the purposeful avoidance of unpleasant
information and/or the purposeful nonresponse of any knowledge
unwantedly received.
Since Blissful Ignorance has rarely been objectively measured in
business organizations (if at all), an exhaustive search for measur-
able constructs for Blissful Ignorance suitable for business organi-
zations and researchers was unsuccessful. Therefore, the author(s)
of this paper suggests that future studies start with the following
four possible manifestations of blissful ignorance, adapted from the
work by Roberts (2013), p. 1) the avoidance of knowledge that is
unpleasant; 2) the nonresponse to knowledge unwantedly
received; 3) the employment of conceptual frameworks that are
crude and/or limited, and; 4) the employment of rigid pre-
conceptions to reduce uncertainty.
Perhaps the most difficult hurdle, for researchers and practi-
tioners, is the likely contention that ‘blissful ignorance’ will not
exist in business organizations in such rates that would support
meaningful results. While that may be the case among a sample of
business organizations from a diverse number of industries, there
are logical counterpoints to support the assumption that blissful
ignorance would exist in meaningful amounts among companies
from the same industry, such as the hospitality industry, to allow
statistical significant results.
For example, while diversity and vive la difference seem to get
the lion's share of researchers' scrutiny, there are still a number of
driving forces aimed at increasing homogeneity or standardization
across organizations, especially those in the same industry, such as
the hospitality industry. For example, Fredrickson and Iaquinto
(1989) found that over time, and across two very diverse in-
dustries, the companies' decision processes were becoming more
rational, which they named; Creeping Rationality. The act of
benchmarking, is by definition a force for homogeneity, as it is the
search and assimilation of “best practices” (cf. Drew, 1997), and the
same could be said about industry paradigms, which are industry-
wide forces for change (cf. Jauhari, 2014; Jovane, Koren, & Boer,
2003). Therefore, while the author(s) of this study cannot
conclude that ‘Blissful Ignorance’ is widespreaddpotential de-
tractors cannot completely reject the possibility that ‘Blissful
Ignorance’ exists in rates that would lead to meaningful results.
6. Other observations
Beyond our primary and ad hoc findings, there is one notable
observationdthat being the significant negative relationship be-
tween the extent of a company's fall and the extent of a company's
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crisis had, on average, a stronger recovery. While the author(s) of
this study quickly noted that result ran against thewell-worn adage
about digging oneself into a big hole, themost likely explanation for
this finding is simply an artifact of the data, that firms that fell
further had a smaller base (stock price) to build upon, the
assumption being that companies can more readily increase their
stock price when shares are $2/share than when they are at $20/
share.
However, there is still a possibility that something a little more
compelling has been recorded. More specifically, it is quite plau-
sible that the external environment during the frontend of a crisis is
different than at the backend of a crisis. If true, then the next logical
assumption would argue that inflection points exist between the
frontend of a crisis and the backend (Castiglione, 2006), and those
companies capable enough to recognize the environmental
changes, and had the willingness and ability to act on that
knowledge, were able to recover better (Burgelman& Grove, 1996).
However, Wood, Williams, and Gregoire (2012) argues that
different cognitive processes are needed as business leaders travel
through the different phases facing a company, as well (assum-
ingly) in the varied stages of a crisis (Fink, Beak, & Taddeo, 1971;
Orlowski, 2008). Therefore, managers need to be able to recog-
nize and act on these “inflection points” in order to be successful.
Unfortunately, Grove and Andrew (1997) argues that is difficult for
managers to distinguish a strategic inflection point from the regular
hustle and bustle of daily stimuli that managers must scan, recog-
nize and act on.
The results from this study also complements the work by Rost
and Osterloh (2010) who found, among TMTs in a set of banks, a
significant negative relationship between the percentage of finan-
cial experts and firm performance during the same financial crisis
used as the backdrop of the current study. If these two findings are
further validated, it could have significant practitioner implications,
as companies may need to conduct reviews of the demographic
makeup of a firm's upper echelons, more specifically the percent-
ages of individuals with a finance orientation.
Finally, this study adds to the stream of research that examines
the impact of organizational leadership on firm performance dur-
ing times when companies are particularly vulnerable, such as in
times of a crisis. For example Fischer and Pollock (2004) found that
the average management team tenure can decrease the likelihood
of organization failure within the first five months after an IPO.
7. Future research
Prior tests of the upper echelons perspective have used such
diverse dependent variables as: CSR Rankings (Huang, 2013), ROE
(Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009), the degree a firm is inter-
nationalized (Nielsen, 2010b) and lagged variables (Colbert et al.,
2014). Unfortunately, while successfully utilizing an assortment of
dependent variables might be a sign of a robust theory, others have
warned that the upper echelons perspective has become overly
sensitive to the performance measures used (Boerner, Linkohr, &
Kiefer, 2011). Therefore, researchers interested in the impact of
the demographic compositions of organizational leadership on firm
performance during a crisis will need to develop more universally
acceptable measures of company performance during a crisis. This
study limited its measure to the extent of a company's fall and
recovery. However, investigating the speed of a company's fall (or
recovery) and the efficiency and/or effectiveness of its recovery (if
not a composite measure) should be of interest to researchers and
managers alike. In 2012, W.T. Wang proposed a framework for
measuring organizational performance during a crisis However,
outside of case studies, Wang's framework seems rather unwieldyfor empirical studies.
There is also a need to examine differences in crisis manage-
ment across cultures, industries, generations and functional areas,
which would help address the internal and external validity of the
current results. For example, Fowler et al. (2007) found that upper
and middle managers were more aware of a company's crisis pre-
paredness than employees.
This study look at just one kind of crisis, these results could
differ depending, for example, on the complexity of the crisis
(Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; Pandelica & Pandelica, 2009, pp.
311e324). Furthermore, researchers should be encouraged to
investigate variables that might moderate the link between the
demographic characteristics of organizational leadership and firm
performance during a crisis, such as organizational slack (cf.
Boerner et al., 2011; Wu, Zelong, & Qiaozhuan, 2011).
Finally, this study assumed that investor actions were the result
of signals, real or perceived. Therefore, future research should seek
to uncover those specific signals that most influence perceptions
amongmarket participants in a time of crisis. And finally, this study
acknowledges the continued need to examine the ‘black box’ that
may provide the operative mechanism linking leadership charac-
teristics and firm performance (Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton,
2000).
8. Conclusion
By providing evidence that demographic characteristics of a
company's BODs can impact firm performance during a time of
crisis, the current study further validates the upper echelons
perspective (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and to
some extent, Smits and Ezzat's (2003) framework for crisis man-
agement. For practitioners, the findings in this paper suggest that
organizations in the hospitality industry should be judicious when
drawing up their crisis management plans by including instructions
on how to manage the demographic characteristics of the firm's
upper echelons. Finally, the paper suggests that within the upper
echelons of the hospitality industry, there may individuals that
display actions consistent with decision makers that are under the
influence of a managerial variant of the blissful ignorance effect.
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